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WHAT'S WRONG WITH OUR TALK ABOUT
RACE? ON HISTORY, PARTICULARITY,
AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
James Boyd White*

One of the striking and original achievements of the Michigan
Law Review in its first century was the publication in 1989 of a
Symposium entitled Legal Storytelling. 1 Organized by the remarkable
editor-in-chief, Kevin Kennedy - who tragically died not long after
his graduation - the Symposium not only brought an important topic
to the forefront of legal thinking, it did so in an extraordinarily interesting way. For this was not a mere collection of papers; the authors
met in small editorial groups to discuss their work in detail, and as a
result the whole project has a remarkable coherence and depth. In this
Essay I shall build on the idea of that Symposium, but do so in a rather
different way from any of those who wrote for it.
I.

People sometimes talk as though narrative is invariably a liberating
or "subversive" mode of thought, when of course this is not so: stories
can be as authoritarian, reactionary, closed-minded, and self-satisfied
as any other form of discourse. 2 But I think it is also true that the narrative imagination has its own ways of working that can in some ways
be inconsistent with more theoretical or abstract forms of speech. 3
Sometimes you find as you tell a story that it takes on a life of its
own, leading you to places you had not imagined and presenting
* L. Hart Wright Collegiate Professor of Law, Professor of English, and Adjunct Professor of Classical Studies, University of Michigan. A.B. 1960, Amherst; A.M. 1961, LL.B. 1964,
Harvard. - Ed. I want to thank the following people who have given careful and helpful
readings to earlier drafts and helped with bibliographical suggestions too: Milner Ball,
Sherman Clark, Alice Fulton, Don Herzog, James Jackson, Richard Lempert, Sabine
MacCormack, Bruce Mannheim, Deborah Malamud, Robert Nagel, Jefferson Powell,
Rebecca Scott, Joseph Vining, Catherine White, Emma White, Mary White, and Christina
Whitman. I have often followed their suggestions, but sometimes not, and in any event none
of them is responsible in any way for my errors or misjudgments. Since the University of
Michigan is involved in litigation over its affirmative action programs I should also say, what
should go without saying, that I speak only for myself and not the University or its Law
School.
1. 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
2. For an elaboration, see L. H. LaRue, Stories versus Theories, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
121, 134-36 (1992).
3. See J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 858-926 (1973).
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problems of which you had been not consciously aware. This often
happens, to take an extremely minor example, in the drafting of law
school examinations, and I think it happens in larger and more important ways as well. Think, for example, of Huckleberry Finn. My sense
is that in shifting from the traditional third-person narrator, as used in
Tom Sawyer, to writing in the voice of an utterly marginal boy called
Huckleberry, Twain was mainly thinking of the comic and satiric possibilities of the shift. Huck is a social idiot who perceives everything in
a kind of mixed literal and superstitious way: his ignorance of what we
all know makes him look foolish, but his fresh perceptions of the sillinesses of our world often make us look foolish too. As I imagine it,
under Twain's original plan, the use of the first-person narrator would
allow the reader and author alike to feel comfortably superior both to
Huck and to the Mississippi River town of Petersburg.
But as the story proceeds it gets out of control: Huck becomes a
center of moral life; his friendship with Jim is real - by far the best
thing in his life; and Jim himself comes to be seen as a person of extraordinary moral and emotional quality, able to help Huck grow and
change. I will not now rehearse the familiar story, but want only to
point out that after the famous moment in Chapter 16 at which Huck
refuses to turn Jim in to the slave-hunters, the novel comes to a halt.
Huck has come to recognize that Jim is his friend, in a real sense the
only friend he has ever had, and Twain has no way to imagine the next
step in their story. In fact, he stopped writing the book at this point,
and when he came back to it three years later he was able to proceed
only by separating Huck and Jim and by presenting Huck as though he
did not know what he learned in Chapter 16. It turns out that there is
no way Twain can imagine the relation between this boy and this man
in the social world in which they are placed, the only social world
available. I think we could not imagine a life for them in that world either, and that this is a fact full of the deepest social significance.4
In one sense, I suppose, this was a real surprise to Twain, a frustration of his comic and satiric intentions. In another sense it was of
course no surprise at all, for the story came from within Twain as an
expression of a deep and troubling truth at the center of his own experience.
II.

I mean all of this as prelude to an effort of my own to raise a question with which my own imagination, and I think that of the law, cannot adequately deal, namely, the meaning of what we in our world call
"race," especially in the context of "affirmative action." Race is of
4. For a fuller statement of what I suggest about Huckleberry Finn, see my recent book
THE EDGE OF MEANING 28-49 (2001 ).
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course the topic on which Huckleberry Finn ran aground, and I think
we do too - or at least I do. I believe a large part of the problem is
the way we tell the story of race in our culture, so in a small way I shall
carry forward the theme of the Symposium to which I referred at the
outset, where several of the writers - Patricia Williams, David Luban,
Milner Ball, Mari Matsuda, Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and Clark
Cunningham - spoke specifically to narratives about race in America.
At the same time I shall engage in more analytic modes of thought as
well, though these turn out to have the property that stories often
have, namely, that they bring me in the end to a point I had not imagined at the beginning.
My starting point is my sense that there is something awry in the
way we in the law talk both about race in general and about affirmative action in particular, something simply missing, or misrepresented.
The legal arguments and judicial opinions I read have in general a
smooth and plausible and honorable feel, but I have a nagging sense of
something deeply wrong, as deeply wrong perhaps as what Twain discovered in his own way of imagining the world. I cannot prove that I
am right, or even say with any clarity why I feel as I do, or what it is
that is missing or wrong. This Essay, then, is thus really a tentative exploration of an intuition, and I suppose it will be of interest, if any,
only to those who in some way share both that intuition and the sense
that it cannot yet be quite articulated.
A word about the genre of this Essay. It will contain some factual
assertions, some analytic points, some normative judgments, but it is
meant to be something different from the sum of these elements and
not reducible to them. You might say it is about the way I - and we
- imagine certain things: our history, especially our racial history; the
role of race today, especially the racial line between those we call
white and black; the point of affirmative action, especially in the university. Since race is not a biological but a cultural fact, I shall be exploring an aspect of our culture, and its history, from the point of view
of a participant in it. This kind of work has an ineradicably personal
element, for our imaginings are always individual as well as shared. I
am trying to say how things really look to me, and this is a function of
my own experience and capacity and perception. It is necessarily the
case that they will look somewhat different to others, and this is all to
the good.5 As a matter of form, the first half of the Essay will develop
5. What I am trying to say here is difficult to articulate. An analogy might help. If you
look at a series of great portraits, say by Rembrandt, or of facial studies that are not formally
portraits, say by Vermeer, you naturally find yourself trying to understand the person whose
image is before you. This is a matter of reading tiny signs in the face - evidence of tension
in the cheek or of quizzicality in a partly raised eyebrow or of petulance or resistance in the
curve of a lip. If the painter has done his job well you have a sense of the person as real, with
depth and complexity and a character you can begin to grasp. For him to do this, the painter
has to master, perhaps without ever being able to make his knowledge explicit, the ways we
read faces of real people in the world. This is a capacity we all have; it is one way we decide
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the intuition I spoke of above, asking the reader whether or not he or
she shares my perceptions; the second half will identify certain consequences that might flow from this intuition if it were shared.
My fundamental point in casting the Essay as I do is to claim that
even to ask the question of how we think of race in the law is to draw
attention to an act specifically of the imagination; and that thinking
about race has some of the features of narrative, including the presentation of characters against a background, engaged in a sequence of
events for which a meaning is claimed - and often a meaning that
works as something of a surprise.
I am speaking here of the problem of white talk about race, since
for these purposes legal talk is white talk. 6 For decades, even centuries, American blacks and Asians and Hispanics and others have tried
to tell the story of race as they experience it, often with great eloquence and with considerable effect on particular readers, but with
very little effect on the law, or on the way most lawyers and judges
think. In a modest way I am trying to say something brief, from my
own perspective as a white person, about what I see when I look at the
world of race and at the way we in the law talk about it. 7
III.

As David Luban suggests in his contribution to the Symposium I
mentioned8 - an essay comparing Walker v. Birmingham 9 with Martin
Luther King's Letter from Birmingham Jail1° - narrative works at the
public or political level as well as the local and particular. Indeed, a
part of every lawyer's task is to tell the story of the law - including,
when appropriate, the history of the nation and its culture - as well as

whether to trust or mistrust another, or form our expectations about their intelligence or
sense of humor. Yet I at least cannot render this knowledge explicit. This is real knowledge,
but it lives at the line between the conscious and the subconscious, available as a ground for
action but not as the stuff of intellectual analysis.
I think our perceptions of race, and what it means, work in much this way, intuitively, instantaneously, felt not as conclusions reached from evidence but as direct registers of the
world. They are simultaneously created by our inarticulate beliefs - expectations, larger
understandings - and create such beliefs, all at a level that is only partly available to the
conscious mind. This is in a sense where race happens; and in the first part of this Essay I try
to say something about what I perceive in myself and others in this dimension of life.
6. Of course there have been crucial contributions made by black lawyers and judges,
but these have necessarily been contributions to a discourse largely shaped and maintained
by whites.
7. Sometimes I will use the word "we" deliberately to mean "we white people," sometimes more inclusively. I hope the context will make clear which use I intend.
8. David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2152 (1989).
9. 389 U.S. 894 (1967).
10. M.L. KING, Letter From Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 77 (1963).
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the particular story of his or her client, and to do so in a way that both
makes sense of the relevant material in each dimension and also produces an essential coherence between the two stories themselves. This
means that some of the problems and opportunities of narrative are
present whenever the lawyer speaks, including about the law and its
history.
Here is one highly reduced and familiar version of our national
story about the racial line between white and black: once we had racial
slavery; then we had the Civil War; then we had the great Civil War
Amendments, prohibiting slavery, protecting the right to vote against
racial discrimination, and prohibiting all the states of the Union from
denying any person "equal protection of the laws"; then we had
Reconstruction, and its abandonment in 1877; then we had Plessy and
Jim Crow; then we had Brown; then we had the Civil Rights Act of
1964, prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race, not only
against blacks but anyone, and finally the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
It all makes up a story of gradual amelioration. The large constitutional question still before us, especially with respect to affirmative action, is what the language of "equal protection" is to mean.
The well-known judicial discourse that the Supreme Court has
fashioned to give meaning to this language maintains that the central
evil against which it is directed is what we call "racial discrimination,"
and that any state action that distributes benefits or burdens, or otherwise regulates, on the basis of race will be subject to what in the jargon of the day is called "strict scrutiny." This in turn means that a classification based on race will be upheld only if it is "necessary" to the
protection of a "compelling" state interest. Where the alleged vice is
discrimination on the grounds of something other than race, but still
presumptively improper - alienage, gender, perhaps some day sexual
orientation - the classification is subject to a less severe but still substantial form of scrutiny. A similar analysis employs similar degrees of
scrutiny when a state regulation interferes with a right thought to be
more or less "fundamental," such as the right to vote or travel. Where
no such suspect classification or fundamental right is involved, the
state can do pretty much as it will, so far as the Fourteenth
Amendment is concerned, subject only to the requirement that there
be a "rational relation" between the regulation in question and a valid
state interest. This is a system of thought and law that is meant to be
rational, coherent, comprehensive, and neutral.
What of the case where a state uses racial classifications in an effort to benefit races that were previously disadvantaged by the law, for
example in ensuring that a certain percentage of public contracts go to
minority businesses, or in using racial identity as a factor in admitting
students to public universities? The courts have for the most part
analyzed these cases in the now-traditional way, by asking whether the
action in question is "necessary" to advance a "compelling state inter-
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est." Both halves of the test are used in turn to attack such programs:
opponents argue they serve no compelling state interest and that, even
if they do, race-based classifications are not necessary to achieve it. On
the other side, proponents deny these propositions, asserting for example a compelling state interest in the educational value of "diversity" and claiming that it can only be attained by affirmative action in
admissions. The ensuing arguments are lengthy, passionate, and repetitive.
This way of talking seems to me, as I said above, to be awry, to
miss - or miscast - something crucial, and my question is what that
is. Where have we gone wrong? My own sense is that a surprisingly
large part of the problem lies in the extreme generality and abstractness of the language of analysis summarized above.
A.

At the most basic level, for example, I think there is something
profoundly wrong with the use of the generic terms "race" and "minority" in the system of thought described above. For, at least as I perceive it, the situation of African Americans in our country is unique
and makes unique claims upon us. I think black people have suffered a
qualitatively different kind of discrimination from any other minority
or race, and continue to do so. Of course it is also true that, particularly in certain regions of the country, the definition of other groups by
what we call their race - including Mexican Americans, Puerto
Ricans, Chinese Americans, Japanese Americans, Native Americans
- has become foundational for a part of our society, with much of the
viciousness that racism entails, including material deprivation, legal
disadvantage, social degradation, and psychological oppression.11 And
immigrants to this country frequently find themselves placed in racial
boxes they did not know existed, with puzzling and damaging conse11. For an account of the relations among blacks, Mexicans, and poor whites in the
Texas cotton belt, see NEIL FOLEY, THE WHITE SCOURGE (1997). For an analysis of the role
of "whiteness" in our culture, see DAVID ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF
WHITENESS (1994). THOMAS HOLT, THE PROBLEM OF RACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2000)
is very good on tracing the deep continuities in racial attitudes and experiences that are
at work beneath evident changes. For further current data, see Harvard Civil Rights Project,
Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Desegregation, quoted in N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2000, at A12, and Richard Morris & Michael H. Cottman, Discrimination's
Lingering Sting, WASH. POST, June 22, 2001, at Al. Three other notes from newspapers
I read while preparing this Essay: (1) a study of 300,000 car loans by a Vanderbilt professor,
Mark A. Cohen, shows that blacks consistently pay more than whites, regardless of their
credit histories, see Car Study Suggests Dealer Bias, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 10, 2001,
available at http://vanderbilt.directtrak.com/fetch/index.cfm?n=35&s=99&o=33&c=143824&t
=ll&e=5264; (2) John Flesher, Black Prison Population Out of Proportion, ANN ARBOR
NEWS, Aug. 1, 2001, at B4, reports that blacks make up 14% of the population of Michigan
but 50% of the prison population; (3) the Texas Defender Service reports that Texas has
never executed a white person for the murder of a black person, see Bob Herbert, Tainted
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A13.

June 2002]

Our Talk About Race

1933

quences.12 In what I say here, I do not mean in any way to disregard
the experience of such groups or to minimize their claims. But I do
think that the maltreatment of African Americans has been distinctive
in its duration, its intensity, its legalization, and its ideology, and that
honesty requires us to admit that this is so.
This is obviously no accident, for the present condition of African
Americans is at least in part a consequence of their experience in our
collective past, namely their forced subjection to a legalized form of
slavery that was designed to destroy their cultures, their dignity, and
their sense of humanity.
This is a moral as well as an historical fact, with unique moral consequences, for American human slavery was one of the greatest crimes
ever committed by one people against another.13 And this is not just
my judgment, or ours; it was a national judgment, reached in the most
painful possible way. Slavery was, as Lincoln said, "somehow the
cause" of our incredibly devastating Civil War - 620,000 dead 14 out of
a population of thirty million - and after victory the status of African
Americans was the subject of the three great Civil War Amendments.
The situation of African Americans is thus distinctive not only sociologically but historically, morally, and - of enormous consequence for
legal talk about affirmative action - constitutionally. The use of the
words "race" and "minority" as though these terms were universals
12. See, e.g., RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY
OF ASIAN AMERICANS (rev. ed. 1998).
13. Human slavery in our country - unlike Greek and Roman slavery, for example was not merely a deprivation of liberty, or a system of forced labor, but a totalizing program
of dehumanization aimed at destroying the sense that those subject to it were in any full
sense human beings. They were denied the right to marry, to maintain families, to read, to
meet or talk with people from the larger world, and so on, with the aim of reducing them to
a condition that by a hideous tautology would justify the system of slavery itself: since we
had made them little more than animals they could be treated as animals. For a collection of
relevant materials, see J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 439-512.
I am speaking here of the object and aim of slavery; the fact that those subject to it were
able to maintain their humanity, wit, and wisdom was one of the great achievements of the
human spirit. See EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLA YES
MADE (1976). For a summary of the world of slavery from which the American version derived, see David Brion Davis, Looking at Slavery from Broader Perspectives, 105 AM. HIST.
REV. 452 (2000), and David Brion Davis, Slavery - White, Black, Christian, Muslim, N.Y.
REV. OF BOOKS, July 5, 2001, at 51-53. For an account of the practice of "convict leasing,"
which kept at least part of the population in something very like slavery until 1930, see
Douglas A. Blackmon, From Alabama's Past, Capitalism and Racism in a Cruel Partnership,
WALL ST. J ., July 16, 2001, at Al, reproduced as Alabama's Justice System Holds Tarnished
History of Slave Labor, ANN ARBOR NEWS, July 22, 2001, at A3 to A6.
I can myself remember those who opposed integration talking of blacks in exactly the
terms I suggest, as being less than fully human, with whom association on equal terms was
unthinkable, intermarriage an abomination. It was in part to resist this conception of who
they were that so many escaped slaves thought it important to tell their story - to show, that
is, that despite the ideology and the attempts of the slave-owning South to create facts consistent with it, they were fully human, capable of thought and speech and feeling and imagination and moral sense, and able to write.
14. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 854 (1988).
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with the same significance the same in every instance simply erases the
special sociological, historical, moral, and constitutional status of African Americans.

B.
So does the word "discrimination" (or the phrase "invidious classification"). for as I suggest above I think the nature and character of
the discrimination experienced by African Americans is different from
any other in our national experience. In fact, although of course I cannot prove this, I believe that for most white Americans "race" really
rders to the line between white and black. I am limited by my own
experience, but I have never heard anyone express towards any other
racial group the intense fear, fascination, loathing, and contempt that
at various stages in my lifetime I have perceived to be frequently,
though of course not universally, directed by whites at African
Americans. While the explicit expression of these feelings is much
rarer than it was forty years ago, at least in the circles in which I move,
there is something in my world that takes its place, namely meaningful
silences, pauses, shifts in tones of voice, all expressive of a sense of an
ontological difference, more than difference, between white and black.
I have never observed this behavior with respect to other "races."
I do not mean to say that members of other racial groups do not
have horrible experiences, even to the point of torture and death, for I
know they do. But I myself do not see the same widespread emotional
charge, the same intensity of feeling, on the part of white people with
respect to the "race" of other groups. For example, no other term of
racial abuse so far as I am aware has anything remotely like the force
of the N-word. 15

15. The reason, I think, is that this word does not merely express _contempt or hatred; it
is an exercise of racist power that recapitulates the experience of slavery itself. Compare
what is so evil about the Nazis marching through Skokie: this is not merely an expression of
hatred or revulsion, nor just the infliction of psychological or emotional harm in the form of
forced recall of trauma, but a way of doing something, claiming the special and odious power
of one who has successfully degraded another. For what the Nazis are saying is something
like this: "Those with whom we identify - Hitler and his underlings - tortured and destroyed and gassed and killed your families and friends, and we are glad they did. If we had
been there we would have done the same. We triumph in your degradation." You can say in
response that the speakers are moral monsters, sadists, crazed, evil; but you cannot make a
comparable claim of power over them. They are like the child-rapist and murderer who
smirks at the parents of his victim, still affirming his pleasure in his crime and his immunity
to any moral claims. To it there is no answer. Likewise, the N-word says: "Our people enslaved and degraded and tortured yours, and we are glad they did. We triumph in your degradation." It is a taunt to which there is no possible response. "Honky" does not do it.
To put it more generally: after Hitler's extermination program one cannot engage in
antisemitic speech without affirming that crime and identifying with its perpetrators; likewise, one cannot use the N-word without affirming the crime upon which it depends for its
force, and identifying with its perpetrators.
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I can remember that in the fifties white people opposed to racial
equality would commonly ask more liberal-minded whites, as a kind of
clincher, how they would like it if their daughter were to "marry one."
The idea was of course to show that even the liberal shared the racism
of the overt racist and should simply admit the fact and follow its logic,
giving up his or her phony claims to moral superiority. Today I never
hear anyone ask that question, which would generally be regarded as
unacceptable. But I think that if this barrier of manners were overcome, and you did ask how your white friends would feel if their child
were to marry a Latino or Latina, an Asian American, a Native
American, or an African American, I think that most would in fact
have far more problematic emotional responses to the last possibility.
Or think of the phenomenon, known all over the country, called
"white flight." This is I think almost invariably, and certainly in its
most intense forms, a response specifically to African Americans
buying houses in the neighborhood in question - and it is not only
whites who move away. Or consider areas of the country where other
forms of racism have predominated, like the Southwest or Northwest,
but where blacks have more or less recently moved, and ask what the
ladder of social hierarchy looks like; I think generally one will find
African Americans at the bottom. My own sense is that no one else
has to face the same wall of feeling - doubt, hostility, contempt, fear
- that black Americans face on a daily basis from their fellow citizens. Faulkner captures what I mean as well as anyone when, in books
like Absalom! Absalom!, he expresses the kind of psychological torture the white mind inflicts upon itself and others as it tries to deny the
full humanity of those it knows are fully human.
In sum, I think the racial line between white and black is far more
significant in the lives of white people than any other, and if that is
more generally true, honesty requires us to recognize that fact. 16 To

16. I know this is a difficult and somewhat controversial point, and that it does not help
that the person who makes it is white. What do I know of the experience of the various racial
minorities in this country, after all, and who am I to speak to their circumstances? And suppose that African Americans as a group are worse off, socially and materially: exactly how
should that matter to Vincent Chin, say, beaten to death by a pair of thugs for being Asian,
or to the Mexican woman living with her children in a trailer on an isolated butte in
Colorado, without schooling or medicine or anyone who speaks her language except the boss
who employs her family, or the American Indian child, growing up without hope, without an
economic future, on a reservation in South Dakota? Indeed, how should it matter to the
white family, barely surviving in desperate poverty in a West Virginia village, facing without
help the diseases endemic to their condition?
This is a complex set of questions, to put it mildly. I think that no one in a country this
rich should suffer the sort of poverty that millions do - and that they do is a national embarrassment and disgrace - but it is also true that all of us, of all races, have a powerful interest in living in a world that is as free as possible from the evils of racial thought and feeling. In this connection, the violent and systematic subordination of blacks seems to me to
have a special status in our country's life, past and present, and in our Constitution as well.
To say this does not and should not mean blindness to other injustices.
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put it bluntly, I think that whites are as a general matter much more
racist in their attitudes towards blacks than any other group, and that
this shows up in our behavior and in the social structures we fashion
and support. To this extent the white racists of the fifties were then and still would be - right about the rest of us.
All this does not mean that the Fourteenth Amendment does or
should speak only to the relations between whites and blacks, or that
affirmative action is proper only with respect to that group. Though I
recognize that some of the arguments against it have force and validity, my own view is that the highly varied kind of affirmative action
practiced at my own and other universities is a right and good thing,
and for a range of reasons: to compensate for past deprivation and disAre the purely material conditions of life in fact worse for blacks as a group than for any
other group? This is in one sense an empirical question, and the answer to it would naturally
depend to some degree upon the way conditions are measured - in terms of income, housing, safety, schooling, participation in government, and so on. For a sobering set of statistics,
see Alan Hutchison, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637, 662-64 (1987),
quoted in Luban, supra note 8, at 2160.
But there is a sense in which no conditions are purely material: the question is what they
mean in the lives of the people who face them. (Think of the voluntary poverty of a monk or
a nun, which is at least sometimes embraced with joy.) And the meaning of the conditions
black people face is the work of the history to which I have been referring - the history and
its present life in the minds of white people.
For one account of the way in which white racism against blacks takes a physical toll on
the body, see Sherman James's fascinating explanation of the severe difference between
white and black hypertension. Sherman A. James, John Henryism and the Health of African
Americans, 18 CULTURE, MED., & PSYCHIATRY 163-82 (1994); see also Rodney Clark et al.,
Racism as a Stressor for African Americans: A Biopsychosocial Model, AM. PSYCHOL., Oct.
1999, at 805 and Chalmer E. Thompson & Helen A. Neville, Racism, Mental Health, and
Mental Health Practice, 27 COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 155 (1999). Especially interesting to one
concerned with affirmative action in the university is MARGARET A. GIBSON & JOHN U.
0GBU, MINORITY STATUS AND SCHOOLING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF IMMIGRANT AND
INVOLUNTARY MINORITIES (1991), which, as the subtitle suggests, argues that voluntary
minorities - those who choose to come to this or another country - have a radically different experience from indigenous or involuntary minorities. The former have made a decision
to move; they can remember the conditions from which they escaped; and they can look
forward to better times ahead - all of which are not available to a community that has experienced systematic and longterm oppression, especially by "race," which is a marker one
cannot normally leave behind.
The conditions of Native Americans are comparable in important ways to those of
blacks. The basic indicators of prosperity in these communities are for the most part extremely low - infant mortality, life expectancy, employment, income, alcoholism and other
addictions, income, and political power. Native Americans are classic involuntary minorities,
having been conquered by the immensely more powerful whites, made the object of genocide, and later treated shamefully. They are situated differently from blacks, however, in another way, which is that while there was a white war against them, in some sense a national
war, there was no war about this war, no collective judgment that they had been treated unconscionably, and no constitutional amendments based upon that judgment. They do nonetheless have a special place in our constitutional tradition. As with African Americans, their
story is a tragic one, littered with broken promises, and it calls for a response from us. But
our constitutional text and tradition treat Native Americans largely through structural arrangements, rather than by denying, and then restoring, individual rights. Any adequate
analysis of constitutional questions relating to affirmative action or other programs designed
to aid Native Americans must begin with this distinctive and equally unique fact. The articulation of such an approach is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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crimination, at both the individual and group level; to improve the
quality of education for all students, and teachers too; and to help
achieve a deep change in the ways in which we relate to one another
across what we conceive of as racial lines. To return to the virtually
all-white university of the past would be a dreadful thing. My point is
not to put these practices into question, but to say that in the case of
African Americans, there is an additional and deeper justification,
rooted both in the nature and intensity of white racism against blacks
and in our constitutional history.

c.
A second, somewhat different, way in which our language of "discrimination" misleads is this. In some forms, at least, this language assumes that the evil against which it is directed is a kind of stereotyping, that is, a false assumption that a particular individual has a set of
social, personal, or physical characteristics in common with the larger
group of which he is part - that he or she is good at math or basketball, or has a sense of rhythm or a hot temper. On this view the main
vice of discrimination is that people are not judged accurately on their
individual merits, but lumped with others with whom they do not belong. As an economist might say, discrimination is bad because it distorts the information flow and leads to defective market judgments in
social and commercial relations.
This is indeed a bad thing. But it is not the heart of white racism
against blacks, which I think is not so much a matter of cognition or
perception as of desire. Think of what we call Jim Crow laws, for example, prohibiting blacks from drinking at white water fountains, or
sitting in white waiting rooms, or going to white schools. These laws
did not rest on a mistaken lumping of the individual with his or her
group, but had among their other aims a totally different reward for
white people: the pleasure and satisfaction of treating other people
like dirt, as less than you, less than human in fact, secure in the knowledge that as beings without rights they presented no legal, economic,
or physical threat.17 This is as base a desire as exists in human nature,
17. CHARLES s. JOHNSON, GROWING UP IN THE BLACK BELT 277-80 (1941), has a list
of interracial taboos in certain southern counties that confirm this assessment, as does the
famous account of race relations in GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944),
especially at 610-15. Jim Crow was of course a complex phenomenon, trading on and stimulating the feelings I describe, and others too - like the sense that blacks were a source of
contamination, with whom any intimacies were degrading for a white person - but also
driven by domestic political interests, especially the desire of the established Democratic
Party to consolidate its power by excluding the black voter. For this disturbing story, including the complicity of the federal judiciary, see J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICOONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONEPARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); the classic, c. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW, (3d. rev. ed. 1974); and the fine discussion of Giles v. Harris, 189
U.S. 475 (1903), and its background, in Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and
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but it does exist, potentially in all human beings, and it was present
and active in the laws I describe. And I think it is often present and active in white responses to blacks today - including in the affirmative
action debates, where it takes the form of superficial lament, but internal satisfaction, when "these people" prove themselves inferior
once again.
The feelings I describe have vastly greater consequences than most
of our talk recognizes. Think of the way in which issues relating to the
"inner city" or welfare or schools or crime or public health are talked
about in our media, in political debates, and so on. I believe that just
barely beneath the surface of these conversations is a conviction that
what we are really talking about is black people, and that they are not
fully people, not fully entitled to the kind of equality that is the linchpin of democracy. 18 We know this, for our government and society systematically fail to afford poor blacks the minimal conditions for a decent and healthy life. My own sense is that we would not tolerate on
such a scale living conditions like those of many urban blacks if the
people subject to those conditions were white, and that we do tolerate
terrible conditions for some whites in part because to address them seriously would require us to do the same for blacks, and this we will not
do. This is not a matter of stereotyping but of dehumanization, in
some sense deliberate dehumanization, to which we - those with
power in our country - tend to be blind, but which stands out as a
shocking blot on our nation in the eyes of visitors. 19 The ghettoes of
the North have taken the place of the slave quarters of the South.
I think that the line we maintain between white and black has the
effect of corroding or disabling our democracy in another way, for it
divides people where other interests would seem to unite them - interests in good public schools, in sensible penal policies and humane
penal institutions, in rules concerning drugs and drug use that focus on
education and rehabilitation instead of incarceration, in a decent public health system, in adequate transportation, in sensible controls on
spreading suburbs, and so on. In every one of those issues, I believe,
one can see at work the cancer of racism, and its effect is to distort
the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2001). For a comparative study of post-slavery regimes, see FREDERICK COOPER ET AL., BEYOND SLAVERY (2000).
18. For a fine account of this phenomenon, see DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN SANDERS,
DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996), especially chapter five, Subtle Prejudice for Modern Times; see also HOLT, supra note 11, and the Gallup
Poll fortuitously released as I was working on this Essay (July 11, 2001), showing wide disparities in black and white perceptions of our common situation and attitudes towards it.
19. We are so accustomed to our own system of racism that it seems natural, until we
are forced to see it with outside eyes, say those of European visitors. Or imagine this: You
become friends with a black African while working or studying in England; you suggest that
he or she visit America, spending a few weeks traveling then staying with you at your home
for a couple of weeks. What would you find yourself obliged to explain to your friend about
your country, as he or she set off alone to travel in it?
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democracy at the most basic level by preventing the formation of effective political majorities that would otherwise exist. Race may in this
way be the cause - or a cause - of our remarkable public heartlessness as a nation, all the more surprising given our private generosity. 20
D.
A more familiar point is that the language of equal protection is
disturbingly abstract also in the terminology of its tests: "strict scrutiny," "compelling interest," "necessity," "suspect classification," etc.
One can see some of what underlies this tendency, and it is in its own
way good: the desire for neutral, abstract principles that will not commit the Court to the side of any litigant ahead of time. The ideal is to
create a kind of elegant intellectual structure that will decide cases in
neutral and predictable ways, perhaps with a little adjustment from
time to time by the Court, without requiring the Court to take sides in
important political debates or struggles. The hope is that this part of
constitutional law will be real law, with the prestige and protection of
universal categories and universal reason. At stake is the legitimacy of
the Court itself, which depends upon its functioning as a legal and not
a political agency, or so it is thought. 21
But all this turns out to be something of a fa~ade. Who, after all, is
to decide what is a "suspect classification" or a "fundamental right" or
a "compelling state interest,'' or whether a regulation is "necessary,"
and how are they to do so? These are not self-applying terms, and
there is in the summary I have given, and I think in the opinions I have
read, no coherent articulation of general purposes or values to which
the Court could sensibly refer to give them definition. To think of this
in the context of affirmative action cases, imagine yourself a judge
asked to decide whether "racial diversity" offers educational benefits
that rise to the level of a "compelling interest." How would you do
this?
As is well known, the definition of these terms has fluctuated, with
the result that the law at the moment is not very far from the kind of
interest-balancing that simply puts control of the essential questions in
the hands of the Court and gives up all but the pretense of the kind of
control by reason and category that underlay the effort of doctrinal
abstraction in the first place.22 My sense is that in the end the intellec20. By this I mean both charitable giving, which of course goes to a wide range of beneficiaries - including blacks, though I doubt to a proportionate degree - and also the far
more local habits of neighborliness and helpfulness, which in the nature of things tend to
benefit those closest to us.
21. For a classic evocation of the ideals of neutrality and generality, see Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
22. For an interesting analysis of the tendency of the contemporary Court to frame its
decisions in formulas, see ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 121-155 (1989).
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tual structure that was meant to control and guide judicial discretion
has to a large degree only masked it.
Likewise, the language most often used to justify affirmative action
in education, that of "the educational benefits of diversity," seems to
me at once too abstract and too anemic. It is not a marginal improvement in the quality of college education that is at stake, but the power
of the state to address our gravest and deepest social evil in a sensible
way. The proper goal is not simply diversity or variety or pluralism,
whether of "race" or perspective or background, but a fundamental
change in the ways in which African Americans in particular, but
members of other races too, are imagined, indeed are encouraged to
imagine themselves, and in the ways in which white Americans imagine themselves and their past too. The goal is not better education but
social change at the deepest level; it is not a form of reparation, but a
change in the practical and psychological structure of our national
life. 23

E.
Finally, and briefly, a word about an even narrower point, the
common assumption that "preferential admissions" necessarily works
to the cost of the excluded white applicants who have better credentials. Think about the white high school senior, for example, who
complains, in a way sensibly enough, that she has to worry about getting into a good college, while some of her black classmates, with
lower grades and scores, have a better chance of making it. How
would you respond to her? Perhaps this way: Suppose, against the
facts of history, that our fellow citizens of African descent had come
here voluntarily and without the burdens of slavery; that they had
been welcomed just as the Germans and English and Scots were, for
example; and that they thus had had the opportunity to become fully
incorporated as equal citizens, with all that entails, from education to
property. Is it not possible that admission to college would be even
more competitive for you than it is now? The student's complaint, in
other words, rests on the assumption that the superiority in wealth,
power, and culture that whites have enjoyed is the normal state of affairs, which she sees affirmative action to threaten; not that the normal
Compare Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943 (1987).
23. For an argument to a similar point, see Elizabeth Anderson, From Normative to
Empirical Sociology in the Affirmative Action Debate: Bowen and Bok's The Shape of the
River, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 284, 305 (2000). There is often an element of patronization - or
racism, actually - built into the language of "diversity," for it assumes that its beneficiaries
will enrich the lives of the rest of us and do so by fulfilling their function, which is to "represent their people." This is not a respectful way to talk about others, and it replicates the fundamental reifying assumptions of racial talk.

June 2002]

Our Talk About Race

1941

state of affairs would be actual equality between the races, which affirmative action is a small effort to attain. 24
This is just a small instance in which it is plain that, however opposed he or she may be to racial discrimination, every white person is
in some sense - in terms of power, self-image, the right to claim no
race at all - its beneficiary. This is of course profoundly distasteful,
but it is true, and in our efforts to talk about this matter we should try
to reflect that truth. 25
IV.
If I have captured something of the way we talk about race in the
law, especially in connection with affirmative action, and something
too of what is wrong with it, can we find a way to do better? Is
there any other way, in particular, in which we might think about
an affirmative action case, say, one involving the use of racial
categories by a state university in the admission process to ensure so
far as possible the presence of African Americans in the student body?
(I shall assume for the moment that the program reaches only African
Americans, not members of other races.)

A.

The first step might be to think of the Civil War Amendments less
as an effort to create neutral and universal rules of law, to be applied
by the work of a universal reason - as is perhaps true of the Bill of
Rights - than as an effort to address the greatest single social and political issue the nation has ever faced: human slavery and its conse-

24. Some people understandably feel resentful of public efforts to redress racial injustice
on the grounds that their ancestors came long after slavery was over and that they and their
families have not only not practiced racial discrimination, they have been consistently opposed to it. Let the descendants of slaveowners pay, perhaps, but not us, who have done
nothing. There are several difficulties with this position, the most obvious perhaps the one
made in the next paragraph of the text, that all white people are in fact privileged by our racial system, even if they do not wish to be.
Compare also the person who invests today in a German corporation that used slave labor in the past: some portions of the value he is acquiring is attributed to that labor, whether
he likes it or not. Being a white person in America is like buying a house that was built by
slaves before the Civil War.
It is also true that slavery was not so long ago. My own great aunt, whom I remember
meeting, was born in 1860, and I have myself known people whose parents and grandparents
were born into slavery. Equally important, overt and legalized disenfranchisement of black
people continued until the Voting Rights Act of 1965, well within the lifetime of many people alive today.
25. Is it in fact possible that the very commitment to abstraction that characterizes legal
discourse in this field, its search for neutral categories, its erasure of what is historically and
constitutionally special about the situation of black Americans, is partly driven without our
knowing it by the hidden desires of racism? Cf ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:
ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
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quences, particularly the denial of full citizenship to the descendants
of slaves. It is obvious that the Framers of these amendments saw this
as a long process - hence the use of the constitutional amendment as
a way to deal with it - and that they anticipated serious and systematic state hostility to the newly freed slaves, for it is against this danger
that the amendments were meant to guard. The amendments were in
large part aimed at preventing the states from interfering with the process by which newly freed blacks, or those freed earlier, could become
integrated into the nation as full citizens - autonomous, capable, independent.26 This is a way of conceiving of the amendments as designed to achieve something specific in the world, not just as articulations of general political or philosophic principles to be applied to all
alike.
From this perspective it would be simply bizarre to use the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down reasonable state efforts to
help African Americans achieve full autonomy and integration. The
States would be doing just what the amendments wanted them to do
- instead of the particularly odious kind of group warfare they had
waged against African Americans for centuries, and that many of
them were in fact to continue to wage in different guises for another
century at least. "Discrimination" - which sounds like a neutral term
defining a generalized evil - in fact means something very different
indeed when it refers to action by the white majority designed to increase their domination over blacks and when it refers to action by the
same majority designed to reduce it. 27
I am suggesting, that is, that we might think of this set of amendments as being far more "result-oriented" than we usually do, as
aimed less at the articulation of a general principle by which to test all
state legislation than at the specific result of trying to help black
Americans get on their feet and flourish in a world in which they faced
constant racial opposition. 28 This view is all the more compelling, to
26. Indeed, the equal protection language could be read to require more: affirmative
action, in fact, to protect blacks against lawlessness and violence at the hands of whites. See
ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1994), especially her most interesting chapter one, Toward an Abolitionist
Reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.
27. For an elaboration of this point, see, for example, Richard Lempert, The Force of
Irony: On the Morality of Affirmative Action and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 95 ETHICS
85 (1984), and my discussion of Weber in J.B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, 218-22
(1990).
28. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), otherwise so objectionable,
could provide a starting point, for the Court there held that the Fourteenth Amendment was
to be read not as a general grant of power to review the reasonableness or propriety of state
legislation, but as directed to the plight of freed blacks. See J.B. White, Reading Texts,
Reading Traditions: African Masks and American Law, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 117, 125-26

(2000).
The obvious counter-argument to the position taken in the text is (1) that the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not in fact compose that text in terms of race or slavery, let
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me at least, when we consider the disgraceful period of Jim Crow and
the Court's shameful complicity in it, during which the conditions that
the amendments were designed to address were largely continued under the force of law, including legalized disenfranchisement. 29 Given
this history, the Court ought to be extremely deferential to any sincere
state effort to achieve, rather than frustrate, the purposes of the
amendments.
B.

I also think we should reexamine the "state action" doctrine, the
rule that the Constitution reaches discrimination only at the hands of
the state, or one of its agents or subdivisions, not of private parties. In
affirmative action cases the issue arises this way: the Court has agreed
that a state agency, such as a university, may use racial classifications
to counter the effects of its own prior unconstitutional racial discrimination (this would, that is, be a "compelling interest"); on the other
hand, it may not act in this way to counter the effects of discrimination
by other states, or other branches of its own state, and certainly not to
counter the effects of what is termed "societal discrimination." There
are two arguments at work here: first that private discrimination
alone identify the specific condition of black Americans, and (2) that it would have been
worse, for blacks and everyone else, had they done so, for a group-specific protection in a
Constitution otherwise largely part cast in universalist terms would be likely to increase
rather than reduce racial hostility.
Of course it is a real question how the Framers' choice of general language is to be read,
but I do not think that it precludes the reading I propose. There can be no question that it is
the situation of blacks to which the Fourteenth Amendment is mainly directed, especially
when it is read in connection with the Thirteenth and Fifteenth. And to say that the paradigm the Framers had in mind should be treated with particular respect and solicitude in no
way undermines their wish to articulate a standard that would reach other cases as well just as in reading the Fourth Amendment it would be right to give scrupulous though not
exclusive attention to cases that are especially close to the writs of assistance that were the
Framers' paradigm for improper governmental searches. My view is not that the Fourteenth
Amendment should reach no other cases, no other people, but only to say that the special
case of African Americans ought to be treated as the paradigm it actually was.
The second point in the argument given above I think actually reinforces my reading. Of
course one would not want a constitutional amendment framed in terms of one racial group,
and for both the reasons suggested. But that very fact is one reason why the Framers might
have composed a universalist text not out of universalist impulses, but in response to the
dangers and evils of a particular situation. I think it would be much closer to the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment in its context to read it as especially focused on the circumstances of blacks than to read it, as the Court now seems to, as a wholly neutral prohibition
of the use of racial classifications without distinguishing between cases in which those classifications are used to perpetuate the racial domination against which the amendment is directed and those in which they are used to erode it.
29. See especially Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903), explained and analyzed well in
Pildes, supra note 17. For a general history, see WOODWARD, supra note 17. Like Thomas
Holt in his PROBLEM OF RACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 11, Woodward shows that
in race relations as all else there are significant changes over time, some of them dramatic.
But the accounts of both writers express a deep theme of persistent white racial hostility,
sometimes simmering, sometimes on the boil, but always present.
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would have been beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment
when it occurred and thus cannot justify ameliorative action today;
and second that societal discrimination is in any event too amorphous
and uncertain to work as an appropriate standard for legislative action. 30
The view that the Constitution reaches only state action rests on
one great textual pillar, the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment begins with the language, "no state shall ... " and goes on to specify various things, including "deny any person equal protection of the laws." 31
The state action requirement is supported as well by the nature of the
Constitution more generally, which is of course meant to define and
limit the powers of government, not to promulgate general rules of
law. And it is evident that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
at a general level was to subject the state's treatment of the individual
person to substantial constitutional control, which before was not the
case - indeed it could not have been, if the Framers' original compromise on slavery, permitting but not mentioning it, were to survive.
All this amounts to a strong argument for the state action requirement.
But perhaps it is not completely unanswerable, especially where, as
here, the question arises at one remove: the question is not whether
the societal discrimination the state wishes to redress was itself a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but whether its private or societal
character disqualifies it as a justification the state may now invoke to
support its remedial policies.
Think here of the state action question as it arose in perhaps its
purest form, in connection with the series of "sit-in" cases in the early
1960s. The facts were typically something like this: black activists, or
black activists and their white supporters together, would enter a restaurant or store or other such establishment to request service against
the insistence by the management that they would serve only white
customers. The activists would be asked to leave and would refuse.
Usually they would be prosecuted under a statute or ordinance that
was not cast in racial terms but simply made it a crime to enter property, or to remain on it, against the expressed will of the owner. The
question was whether the convictions violated the Fourteenth
Amendment; the obvious argument was that they did not, for the state
was not the source of the decision to discriminate. Exclusion was a
purely private judgment, enforced in a neutral way by the state, which
claims that it would have acted equally energetically on behalf of a
black restaurateur who wished to exclude white customers. The state

30. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909 (1996).

31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The seminal articulation of the state action doctrine is
in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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would in fact have had not the slightest objection, it was said, if an
owner of a restaurant wanted his establishment to be open to people
of both races, or only to integrated groups. A decision for the protesters, it was argued, would threaten the right of the people to make free
choices in the most private aspects of their lives, at parties given in
their own homes for example, or in the choice of rooming house
boarders.
As is well known, the Court found technical ways to reverse these
convictions without directly facing the state action question, in this
way putting pressure on Congress to deal with the issue, which it did in
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. This statute was premised mainly on the
commerce power of the Congress, rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment, and therefore no substantial state action question was
presented. The new antidiscrimination law was conceptualized, in
other words, not as the reversal of a state policy on race but simply as
the regulation of a certain part of the economy, which under the expansive readings of the commerce power in the New Deal cases was
practically the entire thing.
But suppose that Congress had not acted. Is it obvious that these
convictions were beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment?
An argument that they were not could begin with the fact that the line
between state and private action, especially in connection with racial
discrimination, is by no means as clear as the doctrine suggests. First,
consider the fact that in any of the Southern states, and some of the
Northern ones, every act of so-called private discrimination occurring
during the first half of the twentieth century would have had the support of official declarations from every branch of the state government
- executive, legislative, and judicial.32 When a state says that its policy
is to segregate the races in every feasible way,33 in what sense are private acts consistent with this policy merely private acts? It is impossible for me to believe that the governmental policies and declarations
did not have substantial reinforcing, perhaps guiding, effect. One task
and hope of the law is to shape culture, and that means to reach private action; when the law deliberately reinforces a racist culture it may
32. See, for example, the summary of Louisiana law in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S.
157, 178-81 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
33. For one judicial statement of the policy of racial subordination, see Nairn v. Nairn,
87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955):

We are unable to read in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, or in any other
provision of that great document, any words or any intendment which prohibit the State
from enacting legislation to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens, or which denies the
power of the State to regulate the marriage relation so that it shall not have a mongrel breed
of citizens. We find there no requirement that the State shall not legislate to prevent the
obliteration of racial pride, but must permit the corruption of blood even though it weaken
or destroy the quality of its citizenship.
Id. at 756.
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perhaps be held accountable for conduct beyond that which it specifically requires or prohibits. The fact that there is no state policy with
respect to lunchrooms, for example, would hardly undo the effect of
the state's bold and unrelenting commitment to the principle of black
inferiority and the separation of the races.
A more radical way to connect the state with "private" action was
suggested by Justice Douglas in the sit-in cases, when he said that custom could be law and hence "state action" for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 34 His idea I think was that when one group,
in this case whites motivated by racial animosity towards blacks, have
such a practical monopoly of private and public power that they may
simply choose whether to achieve their objectives through the arms of
the state or through concerted private action, it ought not matter
which form of power they elect to use. In other words, when a group is
so dominant that it can use the agencies of the state if it chooses, its
extragovernmental actions ought not be immune from all constitutional co.nsideration simply because it chose to act "privately." 35
In support of Justice Douglas's approach, consider the fact that in
its origins slavery was to a large degree private, not public. Slavery
emerged as a private practice, mainly in the Southern states, presumably with the approval of those with power in the community; only once
34. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 365 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 179-81 (1961). A more familiar argument focused on the
character of restaurants, hotels, lunchrooms, and the like, as businesses "affected with a
public interest." Under ancient common law they had an obligation to serve all people at fair
prices. Of course, the fact that the common Jaw has this principle does not mean that it is
automatically a principle of constitutional Jaw, but Douglas used it to provide a language, a
set of instances and ideas, by which the Fourteenth Amendment could reach some "private"
judgments to discriminate without reaching all - the restaurant but not the social club.
When one adds the fact that these facilities are heavily regulated by the state, the argument
that they are quasi-public becomes still stronger. On the other hand, this way of thinking
would seem to make the restaurants or other businesses "state actors" for all purposes,
meaning that other provisions of the Constitution would apply to them - for example the
Establishment Clause, which would arguably make it unconstitutional for the restaurant
owner to display a religious symbol or text on the wall of his restaurant.
35. Reasoning like this was also at work in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), which
held that "private" political primaries were subject to constitutional limitations (though that
case could presumably be limited to instances where the supposedly private parties were carrying out public functions). One could also invoke here by analogy the arguments against
excessive formalism in corporate law made by Nina Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach
to Shareholder Liability, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (2002).
Unlike the "affected with a public interest" rationale, Douglas's primary approach to
what is involved when a private business acts to maintain white domination over blacks
would not make those businesses state actors for all purposes, but only when they are acting
to reinforce the evil against which the amendment is directed. In this sense, it is another
move away from abstraction to address the particularity of our situation. This is all an argument for the rejection of the now-standard way of thinking about "state action" - by the
degree of "entwinement" between the "state" and the "private actor" - whenever the issue
is the perpetuation of white domination of blacks. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (affirming Metro. Edison., 419 U.S. 345
(1974)).
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so established did it become expressly legalized, through legislative
and judicial action. Indeed, the most comprehensive and draconian
slave codes were not promulgated until the middle years of the nineteenth century, almost 200 years after the beginning. Slavery was a
product of the common law, a legalization of social practice, a fact that
lends support to the idea that social practices born out of slavery
might be within the ambit of the Constitution. A fusion of the private
and the public is built into the history of slavery and racial discrimination alike.
This is recognized in the Constitution itself, for the Thirteenth
Amendment, prohibiting slavery, has no state action language at all,
but simply says:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.36

This amendment makes human slavery the proper object of federal
concern even if it receives no support whatever from agencies of the
state. A federal statute accordingly makes it a crime to treat another
person as a slave, without any requirement that the state (or federal)
government in any way support or involve itself in that slavery. 37
When one recognizes that the sorts of discrimination and abuse to
which the descendants of slaves in this country have been regularly
subjected are, as a cultural and factual matter, an effort to maintain
the view of the world and of other human beings that underlay slavery,
to perpetuate it in another form, it may not be as much of a stretch as
it first appears to hold that the Constitution speaks to systematic racism in the private as well as the public sector - or, to use the language of Plessy v. Ferguson, 38 that it aims at "social" as well as "political" equality.
This argument has special force wherever agencies of the state
have in the past supported racism, and it is even more plausible where
- as is true in affirmative action cases - the question is not whether
"private conduct" or "societal discrimination" is itself subject to judicial regulation under the Constitution but only whether a state may
constitutionally base remedial action upon it, as a legacy of the slavery
against which the amendments are specifically directed. 39 In this con36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,§ 1.
37. 18 U.S.C.A. 77, § 1584 (West Supp. 1994): "Whoever knowingly and willfully holds
to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."
38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. Justice Douglas told the story briefly in Bell v. Maryland: "The Black Codes were a
substitute for slavery; segregation was a substitute for the Black Codes; the discrimination in
these sit-in cases is a relic of slavery." 378 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1964).
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text the second argument mentioned above, that societal discrimination is too amorphous to serve as a ground for state action, seems very
weak. Insofar as the states are themselves trying in a genuine and rational way to address the problem of racial injustice to which the
amendments were themselves directed, their efforts should be applauded and supported, not undermined, by the Court, and the rest of
us.40

c.
One of the difficulties faced by those who defend affirmative action programs is that of explaining exactly why one racial or ethnic
group is included, another excluded. The trial judge in the University
of Michigan Law School case said, for example, that the School had no
principled way of explaining why it singled out African Americans,
Mexican Americans, Native Americans, and Puerto Ricans raised on
the U.S. mainland. 41 If the idea is to remedy past discrimination that
has resulted in under-representation in the legal profession, as some
programs put it, 42 Polish people would certainly seem to have a claim.
And why only Latinos and Latinas who are Mexican in origin? Why
only mainland-raised Puerto Ricans? And how about Asian
Americans, a category that includes an enormous diversity with respect both to prior national and cultural background and to presentday economic and social status? The language of "diversity,'' as I said
above, seems simply too weak to deal with the imperatives presented
by the special circumstances of African Americans, and it leads to distinctions that are hard to explain or defend. My own sense is that affirmative action programs, in some sense originally based on special
moral and political claims of blacks, have been extended in a way that
both makes them harder to explain and justify and ends up diluting
and obscuring the claims of blacks themselves. 43 As I say above, "diversity" does not in my view express what is at stake in the state's effort to address the situation of African Americans.
40. In this field, as in some others, it would in fact be highly desirable to take advantage
of our federal system and permit different states to try different programs and methods, with
the thought that we all might learn something from the process.
41. "Certainly other groups have also been subjected to discrimination, such as Arabs
and southern and eastern Europeans, to name but a few .... " Grutter v. Bollinger, 137
F.Supp.2d 821, 852 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
42. See, for example, the University of Colorado Law School program, quoted (anonymously) in THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 386-87.
43. See the minority set-aside program at issue in City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S.
469 (1989), where "minority group members" included "Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals,
Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts." Id. at 478. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, condemned in particular the inclusion of the last two groups, on the grounds that they have had
virtually no representation in Richmond's population and therefore cannot legitimately be
entitled to remedying of past discrimination. Id. at 506.
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How, then, should we think about affirmative action? I think a line
can be drawn that distinguishes between African Americans and all
others, for the reasons I have been setting forth from the beginning of
this Essay. Rather than strict scrutiny, a very high degree of judicial
deference should be paid to sensible and responsible attempts by the
state to address what is in my view at least the most serious of all our
social and moral problems: racial oppression of blacks. In the university context, this would include not only the judgment to admit
African Americans who would not, on other criteria, be admitted to
universities, but also a decision to spend time and money to help them
to succeed there.
As for other groups, the rationale of diversity, supported by the
desire to redress prior and present patterns of discrimination, does
make sense to me. Without the special case of African Americans,
such a program could be far less race-dependent than it now is, far
more focused on the particular experience and situation of individual
applicants. If diversity of background and experience and outlook is
the goal, and I think it is a fine one, then a university ought to be interested on these grounds in a bluecollar white man, a fundamentalist
Christian woman, a Hasidic Jew, a Sikh or Hindu, a man or woman
from the barrio in Los Angeles, a farm worker's child, a person who
grew up as the only Asian American in her town in Georgia, a woman
who worked during college in a pregnancy clinic in southeast
Washington, an Ojibwe man from the White Earth reservation in
Minnesota, and so on. The burdens or handicaps faced by any of these
people should be relevant to their admission, including those based
upon the fact that others regard them as belonging to a "race" different from the "white race." And if a state, or its universities, did conclude that the circumstances of some other race made claims as a
group comparable to those of blacks - based on past or present deprivation, discrimination, or oppression - I think the courts should
give considerable weight to such a determination too. All of this could
be done far more honestly and intelligibly if the special core case of
the African Americans were recognized as distinctive and treated accordingly.
Obviously, I support affirmative action on the merits, especially for
blacks. But I should stress that the two shifts in doctrine I have suggested - (1) reading the Fourteenth Amendment as focusing especially on protecting blacks against the organized hostility of whites,
and (2) proposing a revision of the state action doctrine along the lines
suggested by Justice Douglas - would not result in a constitutional
obligation that the states adopt affirmative action programs in university or other contexts. These programs are on the merits highly controversial and contested, and while I am strongly disposed to favor
them, I also recognize that rational - if in my view erroneous - arguments can be made against them. These arguments may be cast in
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terms of fairness to white applicants, the importance of neutral standards of intellectual achievement and capacity, the claim of damage
done to the intended beneficiaries of the program, or the improper
omission of whites who have suffered economic and other forms of
deprivation. In my view, the States would be constitutionally entitled
to be persuaded by these arguments, disagree with them on the merits
though I do. My main point here is very different, having to do with
the attitude the Supreme Court - and lower courts, too - should
take towards a state agency that has considered these matters, heard
arguments both ways, and come to the conclusion that such a program
is a wise and good thing. Given the aims of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the shameful history of the nation - including state
and federal courts - since that time, I think the Court has no business
"strictly scrutinizing" reasonable state efforts to advance the purposes
of the Civil War Amendments, but should instead be glad that the
state has assumed the kind of responsibility it has and defer to its rational judgments.
Race - and by this I mean the socially-defined line between
whites and blacks - is the ultimate taken-for-granted of our culture;
we maintain it, both in our official and in our unofficial behavior, as I
in fact have been doing throughout this article. It is a continuing badge
of slavery. So long as it exists, the Court should display, at the very
least, a tolerant attitude towards state efforts to end the evils it has
produced.
D.
One more point, which brings us back to Huckleberry Finn and its
implication of the white reader in the racism that is its subject. Built
into the argument at every stage so far is the belief that people are in
fact of different races. Everyone knows that whites are one thing,
blacks another. Intermarriage is of course possible, but again, everyone knows that the child of such a marriage is black, not white. Yet it
is perfectly plain that race is not a natural or biological fact. 44 Surely
the social rule regarding children of mixed marriages - that they are
"black," not "white" - is a demonstration that race is an arbitrary social and legal construct; a system of racism could with equal plausibility hold the opposite, that one drop of the blood of the master race entitled a person to all the privileges of that status. Many of the physical
features we associate with "race," such as skin color and facial features
are inherited separately, not as a package. And similarity in skin color
may in fact not represent a common ancestry, but a parallel adaptation
to similar conditions on the part of distant populations. If you turn to
44. For a good introduction to this issue, see STEPHAN MOLNAR, HUMAN VARIATION,
RACES, TYPES, AND ETHNIC GROUPS (2d. ed. 1983).
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genetic studies of race, you find that Africans have greater genetic
variation than other populations - think of the towering and thin
Masai compared to the short pygmies, for example, and the enormous
variation in head shape and facial features among in habitants of that
continent. This makes it exceedingly odd to think of Africans as a
single race. But we whites tend not to see these differences, or not to
see them clearly, because in our minds they are less significant than
the single criterion of skin color. This is what it means to have a mind
shaped by the ideology or race: to think that the differences we choose
to observe are real and natural.

E.
Finally, I wish to draw attention to another feature of the language
of race, and a source of its power, namely, that it creates a connection,
a web of identity and responsibility in fact, between people who have
not chosen each other and are not related by blood or marriage. Thus,
when a black man steals or rapes or kills, white people tend to look to
black people, or at least black men, in a demanding or at least questioning way: "What have you to say about that? You people are .... "
But by what warrant do we whites do that? The person we implicitly
address, or hold responsible, has no more real relation with the criminal than we do. Think how differently gender works. I suppose a vast
majority of violent crimes are committed by males, but it is not common to see the acts of one male attributed to all. Our culture does not
draw among men the kind of connection that it regularly draws among
those defined by race, especially African Americans.
The language of race in this context, white against black, works
like the language of war. Its logic is the same as that by which a nation
at war holds all of the enemy people responsible for what any of them
does. In the case of war, this feature of the language has a dreadful but
real purpose: it enables us to deny the humanity that unites us with the
people on the other side, a denial that is necessary for war to go on at
all. It is what enables a person to drop incendiary bombs on Tokyo or
Dresden or London or Baghdad. The psychological cost of this denial
is enormous, for it is obviously false, but, as I say, it is necessary to the
existence of war, to which we must look for any justification.
That our language of race works like a language of war is no accident, since its origins were as a language of war, a language that would
justify the war of whites against blacks - their seizure, sale, and total
subjugation, by torture and murder if necessary.
This may explain a feeling I have had about Brown v. Board of
Education, 45 that it was a victory like a martial victory, a triumph over
an enemy - and hence that it was entirely beside the point to agonize
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
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about whether it treated with appropriate "neutrality" the conflict between the white desire for segregation and the black desire for integration.46 There is a real sense in which the Civil War did not end at
Appomattox, but continued, with African Americans as its continued
victims, at least for another century. As a white Northerner in the
fifties, I can remember feeling with great self-righteousness that the
evil against which Brown was directed was specifically and exclusively
a Southern one, a remnant of the war in fact. In those days "Yankee"
and "Rebel" were still terms of ordinary speech, and I think my own
feelings about Brown, though I only recognized this recently, were
those of victory, victory in a war - one that would require further action, of course, for the war was not yet entirely won, but a decisive victory nonetheless.
It also explains something else, for me at least. I was myself raised
to believe that the language of race drew lines among human beings
that ought never to be drawn. The inference I drew was that race is a
topic on which one should never speak. To refer to another person's
race in their presence was an ultimate rudeness; to do so in their absence a kind of dishonesty. When the issue of affirmative action first
arose in my life, very early in my teaching years at the University of
Colorado, I argued strenuously that it ought to be race-neutral, and
that it should speak instead of hardship, deprivation, oppression, on
the view that these were ultimately individual matters. I think what I
was seeing, without quite knowing it, was that the language of race
was the language of war, and I thought it should never be used. But I
now think this was and is an impossible principle: race is in fact created by our society, and given meaning, and we cannot deny this. We
have to use the language, bad as it is.
The days of Brown, and the early days of affirmative action, too,
were days of innocence of course. We can now begin to see, even
Northerners like me, what Lincoln told us in his Second Inaugural,
that this is and was one nation, with one history and one great defining
national "offense," to use his and the Bible's word, in which all white
people and the state itself are implicated. The true story is that the evil
of racial thought is not Southern but national, and the battle of today
is not between geographic regions but within our hearts. Yet all this
suggests that the nomenclature of the Civil War Amendments has
more relevance than is commonly recognized, and not only as a matter
of the context in which they were promulgated and adopted. They
speak to a civil war that still rages in our society, in our schools, in our
selves, and they should be so interpreted.47 I think it is the right, the
46. See Wechsler, supra note 21.
47. The fact that racial language is in its origins and nature a language of war helps explain a peculiar feature of its use, namely that the question who is to be included within each
group becomes highly problematic in a range of circumstances and is often highly contested.
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only thing for the Court to recognize that white racism is the continuation of a war against our fellow citizens, defined by "race," and that as
an evil of this kind, it calls for responses that rest on the great purposes of the Civil War itself and the amendments it made possible,
certainly to the extent of adopting an attitude of respect and deference, indeed thankfulness, towards every reasonable effort of the state
to bring that war to an end.

* * *
This Essay has been my effort to say, in very brief compass, something about the way I see race imagined and acted on in our world,
and in the law. For me the abstract and supposedly neutral language of
legal analysis is hopelessly inadequate to the facts of our situation, including: our history of over two hundred years of a deliberately degrading racial slavery, the significance of our Civil War and the
amendments that gave its achievement shape, the meaning of the next
century of state violence and oppression against blacks, and the continuing neglect and contempt to which blacks are subject. Its use of the
general categories of "race" and "discrimination" and "diversity"
draw attention away from the special claims blacks may properly
make on the institutions of this society, and indeed from the special
histories of other racial groups as well.
When Mark Twain finds himself imagining more and more fully
the relation between Huck and Jim as a relation between human beings - a relation of love and redemption, in fact, for Jim saves Huck
not only pragmatically but psychologically - he brings simultaneously
into the circle of attention the moral impossibility of racial thought
and its unavoidability. We are now in truth situated much as he was
then. There is no easy way to imagine ourselves out of the world of
deep and violent injustice we have created, and that we recreate every
day. But that is our task, and we shall have a much better chance of
doing something right and valuable if we can find ways of talking and
thinking, ways of telling our national story, that will do justice to its
meaning.

For this is a characteristic of the language of war as well: Are you one of "them," that is, one
of the enemy whom we regard ourselves as justifiably killing? Or are you too young or too
sick or too weak or too old, or too much at odds with government, to count? The consequences are enormous but the line uncertain. So, too, with respect to race: Are you really
"black," hence (1) subject to slavery or (2) entitled to make claims based on a history of
slavery? Are you really "white," hence in some way responsible for this history, or a beneficiary of it? And so on.

